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INTRODUCTION 
In 2008, a prominent Philadelphia businessman, Donald Dougherty, Jr., 
was charged with nearly one hundred counts of fraud, theft, bribery, and tax 
evasion.1 Dougherty was accused of engaging in illegal accounting practices 
as the owner, president, and sole shareholder of Dougherty Electric, Inc., an 
electrical contracting business.2 As a result of the accounting scheme, 
Dougherty defrauded the United States government of well over $1 million 
in taxes.3 In addition, Dougherty defrauded IBEW Local 98, the union with 
which his business contracted, of more than $670,000 in contributions owed 
to the IBEW benefit and pension plan.4 Dougherty pled guilty to all charges.5 
After Dougherty entered his plea, the court sentenced him to twenty-four 
months in prison.6 In addition, pursuant to the federal Mandatory Victims 
Restitution Act (MVRA),7 the court ordered Dougherty to repay the victims 
of the crime for the losses suffered, $2.3 million owed in total to the United 
States government and the IBEW.8 The colorful facts of the case aside, 
nothing about the proceeding was particularly unusual.9 
 
1 See United States v. Dougherty, Crim No. 07-361, 2008 WL 5428282, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 30, 
2008). 
2 Id. 
3 Motion to Mark Restitution Award Satisfied at 1, United States v. Dougherty, No. 07-361, (E.D. 
Pa. Mar. 8, 2016), ECF No. 169 [hereinafter Motion to Mark Restitution Award Satisfied]. 
4 Id. 
5 Dougherty, 2008 WL 5428282, at *1. 
6 Motion to Mark Restitution Award Satisfied, supra note 3, at 1. 
7 18 U.S.C. § 3663A (2012). Criminal restitution involves an offender compensating a victim for 
a wrong the offender inflicted on the victim. Restitution, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  
8 Id. 
9 Dougherty admitted to bribing both a bank vice president and a union official to cover up 
the scheme. See Dougherty, 2008 WL 542828, at *1. 
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That is until March 2016, when Dougherty petitioned the District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to have his restitution payment 
“marked as satisfied.”10 Dougherty had made a lump-sum payment of $2.5 
million to the federal government in December 2015, which fully satisfied his 
outstanding restitution and back taxes.11 Additionally, Dougherty had entered 
into a settlement agreement with the IBEW in 2011.12 By the terms of the 
settlement, Dougherty paid a lump sum of $200,000 to the union in exchange 
for “satisfaction of all obligations owed to IBEW and the IBEW Benefit 
Funds arising from the conduct underlying the restitution order.”13 In his 
petition, Dougherty contended that he had fulfilled his restitution obligation 
and the court should recognize as much. 
The court has yet to rule on Dougherty’s petition.14 But the question it 
raises is a difficult one—whether a victim and defendant may settle a restitution 
payment under the MVRA is one that courts have not fully resolved. 
The MVRA is the federal statute that regulates restitution for the most 
serious federal crimes.15 Congress enacted the MVRA to bring the federal 
restitution scheme more in line with the objectives of the victims’ rights 
movement by forcing sentencing judges to enter orders of restitution for the 
full amount of a victim’s loss. In passing the MVRA, Congress severely 
restricted judicial discretion in ordering restitution at the time of sentencing.16 
In the same legislative act, Congress also bolstered the MVRA’s enforcement 
clause to ensure victims could control their participation in the restitution 
process.17 These two provisions are in tension when courts seek to apply the 
MVRA: although both provisions are intended to promote victims’ rights, 
they come into conflict when determining the scope of a victim’s ability to 
settle outstanding restitution orders. 
This Comment argues that the enforcement provisions of the MVRA 
provide mechanisms by which a willing victim may settle an outstanding 
restitution order with a criminal defendant. The MVRA’s limitation on 
judicial discretion is not a limitation on a victim’s ability to dispose of 
 
10 Motion to Mark Restitution Award Satisfied, supra note 3, at 1. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. at 2. 
13 Id. 
14 It seems unlikely that the court will rule on the petition, as over eighteen months have 
elapsed since the initial petition. The reason for this delay, or for the court’s decision to not rule on 
the petition, is not entirely clear. 
15 The MVRA applies to crimes of violence, property crimes, drug crimes, and consumer 
product crimes in which an identifiable victim or victims has suffered a physical injury or pecuniary 
loss. 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(1)(A) (2012). 
16 See § 3663A(a)(1) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law . . . the court shall order . . . 
that the defendant make restitution to the victim of the offense.”). 
17 18 U.S.C. § 3664 (2012); see also infra Section I.A (discussing MVRA enforcement provisions). 
1296 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 166: 1293 
restitution in a way she sees fit. Courts and judges err when they conflate a 
lack of judicial discretion in ordering restitution with a lack of victim 
discretion in settling such an order. 
Not only is this a permissible reading of the statutory scheme, it is also 
a preferable one. The benefits of such an approach are twofold. First, it 
would safeguard the right of victims to participate in the criminal justice 
process, a central tenet of the victims’ rights movement. Second, for at least 
a certain segment of the victim community, it would increase victim 
satisfaction with restitution.  
Part I of this Comment explores the text, history, and enacting intent of 
the MVRA as well as the case law it has spawned. Part II provides a 
framework for analyzing whether the MVRA’s enforcement provisions 
provide a victim with discretion that can be exercised to settle an outstanding 
restitution order. It then applies that framework to three specific provisions 
of the MVRA. Part III explains why victims may choose to settle an 
outstanding restitution order. Part IV explores potential negative implications 
of recognizing such victim discretion. Part V evaluates the procedural and 
information hurdles to settlement and explores policy recommendations for 
Congress and federal sentencing judges to lower those barriers. 
I. RESTITUTION AND THE MVRA 
A. History of Restitution 
Restitution has a long legal history. It existed as a legal rule as far back as 
Hammurabi’s Code.18 From the Bible to the Common Law of England, 
restitution played an important role in the administration of justice in a 
variety of legal systems.19 
Criminal restitution has a similarly long history in America. Borrowing 
from English common law, the early American Republic enacted restitution 
statutes. In 1802, Congress passed a law that provided monetary restitution 
to victims of robbery, larceny, or trespass committed by a U.S. citizen on 
Indian Territory.20 But as criminal law became more formalized during the 
 
18 See THE CODE OF HAMMURABI KING OF BABYLON 13 (Robert Francis Harper trans., 2d 
ed. 1904) (c. 2250 B.C.E.) (“If a man steal ox or sheep . . . or boat—if it be from a god (temple) or 
a palace, he shall restore thirtyfold; if it be from a freeman, he shall render tenfold. If the thief has 
nothing wherewith to pay he shall be put to death.”). 
19 See Brian Kleinhaus, Note, Serving Two Masters: Evaluating the Criminal or Civil Nature of the 
VWPA and MVRA Through the Lens of the Ex Post Facto Clause, the Abatement Doctrine, and the Sixth 
Amendment, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2711, 2717-19 (2005) (providing a brief history of criminal 
restitution from Hammurabi’s Code through the early Republic era). 
20 An Act to Regulate Trade and Intercourse with the Indian Tribes, and to Preserve Peace on 
the Frontiers, ch. 13, § 4, 2 Stat. 139, 141 (1802). 
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later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the role of restitution 
diminished,21 so much so that for a significant part of the twentieth century, 
restitution played only a bit part in the American criminal justice system.22 
The victims’ rights movement in the 1970s and 1980s revitalized 
restitution as a prominent element of the American criminal justice system. 
Emerging out of a societal fear of crime in America, the movement criticized 
the criminal justice system as being too focused on protecting the rights of 
offenders at the expense of victims.23 Calling for a criminal justice system 
that focused on the needs of victims, the movement advocated for federal 
legislation that, inter alia, guaranteed restitution to victims.24 
This advocacy culminated in the 1982 President’s Task Force on Victims 
of Crimes, which conducted a national survey on the challenges faced by 
victims of crime and put forth policy recommendations to address those 
challenges.25 A key component of those policy recommendations was 
legislation guaranteeing victims the right to restitution.26 As the Task Force’s 
Final Report concluded: “The concept of personal accountability for the 
consequences of one’s conduct, and the allied notion that the person who 
causes the damage should bear the cost, are at the heart of civil law. It should 
be no less true in criminal law.”27 
The same year the Task Force was created, Congress enacted the Victim 
and Witness Protection Act (VWPA) of 1982.28 The VWPA created the 
framework for federal restitution, but, critically, it did not mandate 
restitution be ordered in all cases. The VWPA instructed sentencing judges 
to consider “the financial resources of the defendant,” as well as “the financial 
needs and earning ability of the defendant and the defendant’s dependents.”29 
 
21 See Kleinhaus, supra note 19, at 2718 (“[A]s criminal law became more developed, the idea of 
payments between individuals became associated with tort or civil law; the state completely took 
over the administration of criminal law, and restitution became mostly divorced from the arena of 
state punishment.”). 
22 For example, pursuant to the Federal Probation Act of 1925, federal judges could order 
restitution only as a condition of probation. See 18 U.S.C. § 3651, repealed by Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 
Stat. 1987, 2031 (1984) (“While on probation and among the conditions thereof, the defendant . . . 
[m]ay be required to make restitution or reparation to aggrieved parties for actual damages or loss 
caused by the offense for which conviction was had.”). 
23 Kleinhaus, supra note 19, at 2719-20. 
24 Id. 
25 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME 17-18, 72-73 
(1982). 
26 Id. at 17-18. 
27 Id. at 79. 
28 See Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248, 1255 
(codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512–15, 3663–64 (2012)). 
29 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a) (2012). 
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In effect, the statute gave sentencing judges broad discretion to ensure that a 
restitution order did not exceed a defendant’s ability to pay. 
The 1996 Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA) was enacted in 
part to address this grant of judicial discretion.30 The legislation was first 
introduced because the victims’ rights movement and their congressional allies 
were dissatisfied with the leniency shown by judges in determining whether to 
order restitution.31 As the Senate Report that accompanied the MVRA 
observed: “This legislation is needed to ensure that the loss to crime victims is 
recognized, and that they receive the restitution that they are due.”32 
The MVRA mandated that judges enter an award of restitution for the 
full amount of loss suffered by victims. Specifically, the MVRA provides that 
“[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law . . . the court shall order . . . the 
defendant [to] make restitution to the victim of the offense.”33 Moreover, 
Congress required that “the court shall order restitution to each victim in the 
full amount of each victim’s losses as determined by the court.”34 The 
statutory scheme curtailed judicial discretion in an attempt to bolster victim 
satisfaction with restitution. 
An additional and related goal of the MVRA was to create a uniform 
procedure for awarding and enforcing restitution payments. The Senate 
Report stated that “this legislation is needed to replace an existing patchwork 
of different rules governing orders of restitution under various Federal 
criminal statutes with one consistent procedure.”35 Prior to enactment of the 
MVRA, the VWPA provided that restitution orders “shall be issued and 
enforced in accordance with section 3664.”36 As initially drafted, however, 18 
U.S.C § 3664 did not provide a clear means of enforcing restitution orders.37 
Although not explicit in the statutory scheme, victims awarded restitution 
under the VWPA enforced restitution orders through a civil enforcement 
mechanism.38 In contrast, other statutes provided more specific and robust 
enforcement schemes. For example, the Violent Crime Control and Law 
Enforcement Act, which required defendants to make restitution awards to 
 
30 Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1227 (codified at 
18 U.S.C. §§ 3613A, 3663A (2012)). 
31 Senator Paul Simon, an opponent of the bill, complained that the sponsors wanted to 
“replace the current system, which allows judges to order victim restitution in certain types of cases,” 
with an “an inflexible mandate” to order restitution. S. REP. NO. 104-179, at 30 (1995). 
32 Id. at 12. 
33 § 3663A(a)(1). 
34 § 3664(f)(1)(A). 
35 See S. REP. NO. 104-179, at 12 (1995). 
36 § 3663A(d). 
37 Victims’ Rights and Restitution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, tit. V, 104 Stat. 4820. 
38 See, e.g., Lyndonville Sav. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Lussier, 211 F.3d 697, 703 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(upholding an award of criminal restitution obtained through civil enforcement). 
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victims, provides that “[a]n order of restitution also may be enforced by a 
victim named in the order to receive the restitution in the same manner as a 
judgment in a civil action.”39 
With the enactment of the MVRA, Congress both streamlined and 
expanded the enforcement scheme for restitution orders. The MVRA replaced 
the piecemeal enforcement provisions with a single scheme, the procedures of 
a revised § 3664.40 In addition, Congress fleshed out the provisions for 
calculating, awarding, and enforcing restitution.41 According to Congress, the 
mechanisms provide “a streamlined process for the determination of both the 
amount of restitution owed to each victim and the terms of repayment based 
on a reasonable interpretation of the defendant’s economic circumstances.”42 
With only minor changes since its enactment in 1996, the MVRA remains 
the basis of the current federal restitution scheme. 
B. Critique of the MVRA 
Although the MVRA remains good law, several criticisms have been 
levied against the statute and the federal restitution scheme more broadly. 
First, commentators have argued that the federal restitution scheme does not 
comply with the requirements of the Fifth Amendment’s Ex Post Facto 
Clause43 and the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of a jury trial for all elements 
of a crime.44 Although the commentators raise plausible arguments that the 
MVRA brushes up against the constitutional limits of the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments, this Comment will not spend much time discussing these 
arguments for two reasons. First, courts have not found such arguments 
 
39 Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796, 1904 (1994). 
40 Note that the enforcement scheme applies to all restitution orders. See 18 U.S.C. § 3556 
(2012). 
41 18 U.S.C. § 3664 (2012). 
42 S. REP. NO. 179, at 20 (1995). 
43 For discussion on whether retroactive application of the MVRA to a defendant who 
committed a crime before the statute’s enactment is a violation of the Fifth Amendment Ex Post 
Facto Clause, see Irene J. Chase, Comment, Making the Criminal Pay in Cash: The Ex Post Facto 
Implications of the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 463, 468-75 (2001). 
See also Kleinhaus, supra note 19, at 2737-44 (summarizing the Circuit split on the MVRA and the 
Fifth Amendment); cf. Heidi M. Grogan, Comment, Characterizing Criminal Restitution Pursuant to 
the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act: Focus on the Third Circuit, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 1079 (2005). 
44 See Kleinhaus, supra note 19, at 2714-15, 2758-64 (discussing how Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 
U.S. 466 (2000), and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), have led to Sixth Amendment 
challenges to restitution orders under the MVRA and VWPA); see also Judge William M. Acker, Jr., 
The Mandatory Victims Restitution Act is Unconstitutional. Will Courts Say so After Southern Union v. 
United States?, 65 ALA. L. REV. 803, 809-10 (2013) (arguing that the MVRA and VWPA violate the 
Sixth Amendment). 
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persuasive enough to strike down the MVRA,45 so the practical impact of the 
constitutional critique on the operation of the federal restitution scheme is 
limited. And, as will be discussed more fully below, the constitutional 
criticism is not particularly relevant for the question of settlement—whether 
victims may settle an outstanding restitution award is a question of statutory 
interpretation. 
A second criticism of the MVRA, raised by scholars such as Matthew 
Dickman, is that the federal restitution scheme has not furthered its stated goal 
of ensuring victims are adequately compensated.46 Dickman has noted that the 
amount of restitution owed by defendants to victims has exploded even as the 
percent of restitution repaid has declined.47 This argument is much more salient 
to this Comment’s focus and will be explored in depth later.48 
C. The Criminal/Civil Split 
Before moving on, it is important to note that the critiques over the 
constitutionality and effectiveness of the MVRA exists within the context of 
a more fundamental debate over the nature of criminal restitution. To sketch 
that debate quickly, restitution serves two related but distinct goals. First, 
restitution compensates victims of crime. Second, by forcing the criminal to 
pay, it holds criminals responsible for their actions.49 Although these aims are 
not necessarily mutually exclusive, this dual purpose has led to a disagreement 
as to the proper characterization of restitution. That is, whether restitution is 
a criminal penalty akin to a fine, or a civil award like damages. Scholars have 
laboriously tried to resolve the criminal/civil debate and the circuit split that 
it precipitated.50 
Although it is beyond the scope of this Comment to definitively resolve 
that debate, it nevertheless bears upon the following analysis. In interpreting 
the MVRA’s enforcement scheme, courts have used the nature of restitution 
 
45 See Kleinhaus, supra note 19, at 2758 (“The vast majority of federal judges that have heard 
Sixth Amendment challenges to federal restitution orders have used the ‘statutory maximum’ 
language from the Apprendi decision as one method of striking down the challenges.”). 
46 Matthew Dickman, Should Crime Pay?: A Critical Assessment of the Mandatory Victims 
Restitution Act of 1996, 97 CAL. L. REV. 1687, 1690-93 (2009). 
47 Id. at 1690-99. 
48 See infra Part III. 
49 See Kleinhaus, supra note 19, at 2722 (inquiring whether Congress implemented the VWPA 
and the MVRA “to add a punitive measure to defendants’ sentences, or a civil compensatory remedy 
for victims”). 
50 The majority view, endorsed by the First, Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits, is that 
restitution is criminal. The minority view, endorsed by the Tenth and Seventh Circuits, is that 
restitution is civil. See Chase, supra note 43, at 475-88 (discussing the Circuit split); Kleinhaus, supra 
note 19, at 2737-38 (same). 
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as a guide.51 Moreover, a few courts have held that a victim may not settle a 
restitution obligation because “restitution is a criminal sentence.”52 Such 
courts have concluded that permitting such settlements violates “public policy,” 
though precisely why that is the case has not yet been explained.53 More 
concretely, courts have concluded that a victim does not have “the authority to 
settle, release, satisfy, or otherwise modify a restitution judgment.”54 
But such courts fail to recognize that whether a victim has “the authority 
to settle, release, satisfy, or otherwise modify a restitution judgment” depends 
upon the statutory scheme enacted by Congress. A victim may not have such 
authority, but not because restitution is inherently criminal. Rather, the 
ability of a victim to settle restitution is a function of a victim’s right to 
participate in the administration and enforcement of restitution, which is 
determined by the scheme enacted by Congress to enforce restitution 
orders.55 Thus, courts err in concluding that settlement is impermissible 
simply because restitution is (or is not) a criminal penalty. Put differently, the 
ability of victims to settle restitution is a matter of statutory interpretation. 
It is to that statutory language that this Comment now turns. 
II. VICTIM SETTLEMENT 
A. A Framework for Settlement 
It may be useful to first define exactly what settlement entails within the 
context of criminal restitution orders. A settlement is a species of “contract that 
creates legally enforceable obligations.”56 In the civil litigation context, 
settlement refers to an agreement whereby parties settle a dispute or 
uncertainty concerning an obligation or other legal relationship.57 Frequently, 
settlement entails the exchange of concessions to end a dispute or claim in an 
 
51 See e.g., United States v. Ziskind, 471 F.3d 266, 270 (1st Cir. 2006) (“More importantly, the 
prosecution’s standing to seek restitution under the MVRA does not depend on a victim’s actions. 
This is because . . . restitution ordered as part of a criminal sentence is a criminal penalty, not a civil 
remedy.”); see also United States v. Brandner, No. 3:13-CR-00103-SLG, 2016 WL 4644463, at *4 (D. 
Alaska Sept. 6, 2016) (“The Court finds the Second Circuit’s approach to be more consonant both 
with the statutory text and structure and with the Ninth Circuit’s general approach to restitution, 
and adopts and applies that approach here.”). 
52 United States v. Hankins, 858 F.3d 1273, 1277 (9th Cir. 2017); see also United States v. Boal, 
534 F.3d 965, 967-69 (8th Cir. 2008) (affirming the district court’s ruling that a defendant’s 
obligation to pay restitution cannot be waived or released by the victim). 
53 E.g., Boal, 534 F.3d at 967. 
54 Hankins, 858 F.3d at 1277. 
55 See infra Part II. 
56 D.R. Sherry Constr., Ltd. v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 316 S.W.3d 899, 906 (Mo. 2010). 
57 Settlement, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
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attempt to forestall or avoid litigation.58 Within the criminal law context, the 
most analogous proceeding to a civil settlement is a plea bargain. Fundamentally, 
a plea bargain is “[a] defendant’s agreement to plead guilty to a criminal charge 
with the reasonable expectation of receiving some consideration from the state.”59 
This Comment defines settlement as a legally enforceable agreement by 
which a victim forgoes her entitlement to restitution, either in whole or in 
part, in exchange for some consideration from the defendant. As in the case 
of Dougherty and Local 98, a victim may release the defendant from paying 
the full amount of restitution in exchange for an upfront, lump-sum payment 
of a portion of that order.60 At this point, let us put aside the question of 
when or why victims would be willing to strike such a bargain. As will be 
further demonstrated, assume that some segment of the victim population 
would be willing to do so. 
Two conditions, then, must be met for a victim to settle a restitution 
order. First, the statutory scheme must provide the victim with an 
opportunity to exercise discretion to effectuate the agreement. Absent such 
discretion, a victim would not be able to carry out her end of the bargain. 
Second, the exercise of that discretion must absolve the defendant of paying 
restitution either in part or in full. If this is not possible, then the defendant 
will have no incentive to strike a deal. To reiterate, a victim must (i) have 
discretion to effectuate a settlement, and (ii) that discretion must be able to 
absolve a defendant of her restitution order. 
B. Applying the Framework 
Congress enacted § 3664 to manage the administration and enforcement 
of restitution orders. Section 3664 grants victims the right to participate at 
certain points in the administration and enforcement scheme.61 It also makes 
clear that no victim is required to participate in any part of the administration 
of the restitution order.62 Provisions that provide victims a right, but not an 
obligation, to participate in the enforcement scheme satisfy the first necessary 
prong of settlement. Inherent in the right to participate in the administration 
of restitution is the discretion of whether to exercise that right. If § 3664 
 
58 Id. 
59 HERBERT S. MILLER, WILLIAM F. MCDONALD, & JAMES A. CRAMER, PLEA BARGAINING 
IN THE UNITED STATES 1-2 (1978). 
60 This is not the only potential example of a bargain that a victim and defendant may strike, 
but it is probably the most common. See infra Part III. 
61 Those courts who have found restitution impermissible often overlook this point. The 
explicit statutory grant of a victim’s right to participate in the restitution process is why restitution 
payments may be settled. 
62 See 18 U.S.C. § 3664(g)(1) (2012) (“No victim shall be required to participate in any phase 
of a restitution order.”). 
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allows a victim to exercise that discretion in a way that absolves the defendant 
of paying restitution, then a victim may settle an outstanding order. 
1. Pre-Issuance Mechanisms 
Victims cannot settle restitution prior to the issuance of a restitution order 
because § 3664 provides victims with neither a grant of discretion nor the 
ability to absolve the defendant from paying restitution. Section 3663A(a)(1) 
of the MVRA mandates that sentencing judges order restitution in the full 
amount to victims: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law . . . the court 
shall order . . . defendant make restitution to the victim of the offense.”63 By 
eliminating judicial discretion in ordering restitution, the MVRA prevents 
victims from exercising discretion in the issuance of restitution orders. 
Moreover, the MVRA’s enforcement scheme does not provide a mechanism 
for a victim to absolve the defendant from paying restitution at the pre-
issuance stage. 
Although not employing this analytical framework, several courts have 
affirmed this position. In United States v. Gallant, the Tenth Circuit held that 
the MVRA requires the sentencing court to order restitution to victims 
despite an agreement between the victim and the defendant to release the 
defendant from “further liability” in exchange for $60,000.64 The court 
reasoned that a private settlement cannot abrogate the requirement of a 
district court to order restitution to victims.65 This position is consistent with 
the text of the MVRA: Judges must order restitution. The absence of victim 
discretion leaves no means by which a victim can settle a restitution order 
prior to a sentencing judge ordering restitution. 
2. Post-Issuance Mechanisms 
Section 3664 grants victims much broader discretion in structuring, 
administering, and enforcing restitution orders once issued. This too is 
consistent with the text of the statutory scheme. Section 3663A(a)(1) requires 
judges to “order” restitution to victims, but § 3663A(d) dictates that orders 
are to be “enforced in accordance with section 3664.”66 Section 3664 
contemplates more active victim participation in the post-issuance 
enforcement of restitution orders. In other words, the lack of judicial 
 
63 § 3663A(a)(1). 
64 537 F.3d 1202, 1250 (10th Cir. 2008); see also United States v. Elson, 577 F.3d 713, 733 (6th 
Cir. 2009) (rejecting the argument that a private pre-order settlement prevented a district from 
issuing a restitution order). 
65 See Gallant, 537 F.3d at 1250. 
66 § 3663A(d). 
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discretion in issuing restitution orders should not be conflated to limit victim 
discretion in enforcing restitution. 
Three such post-issuance provisions stand out as mechanisms by which 
victims could settle outstanding restitution orders. All three mechanisms 
provide victims with the necessary discretion to effectuate an agreement. 
Further, to varying degrees, the exercise of that discretion can be used to 
absolve defendants from paying outstanding restitution orders. 
a. Section 3664(f) 
Section 3664(f), which grants the sentencing court leeway in structuring 
the payment scheme of a restitution order, is the most limited mechanism by 
which a victim can effectuate a settlement.67 A sentencing court must 
determine whether an order should take the form of “a single, lump-sum 
payment, partial payments at specified intervals, in-kind payments, or a 
combination of payments at specified intervals and in-kind payments.”68 
Importantly, § 3664(f)(A)(4) affords victims a limited right to participate 
in that determination. The provision provides that “if the victim agrees” a 
court may structure restitution as in-kind payments in the form of “services 
rendered to the victim or a person or organization other than the victim.”69 
Here, the first necessary condition is met: the mechanism’s contemplation of 
victim discretion is explicit. In fact, the drafters of the provision recognized 
and endorsed the mechanism as a means by which victims could exercise 
control over the restitution process.70 
 
67 §§ 3664(f)(3)(A)–(4). 
68 § 3664(f)(3)(A). 
69 § 3664(f)(4). 
70 Although this author is not aware of a case in which the provision has been utilized, Congress 
recognized that victims could choose to structure restitution in this way. During a hearing before 
the Senate Judiciary Committee, an exchange between then-Senator Joe Biden and Judge Maryanne 
Barry (then a district court judge for the District of New Jersey as well as Chair of the Committee 
on Criminal Law for the Judicial Conference) illustrates this point: 
Judge Barry: There are other things that can be applied as well. You have it in your 
statute right now [referring to what became § 3664(f)], and quite candidly I have never 
seen it applied, but it is there and there is room for the indigent defendant to do 
something for the victim . . . if the victim consents, the court may order restitution in 
services in lieu of money or make restitution to a person or organization designated 
by the victim, or, I suggest, to the community . . . . 
Senator Biden: Judge, I realize we put that in, but one of the frustrations is . . . no 
court has been imaginative enough or diligent enough or concerned enough or 
interested enough or aware enough to do that. I wonder why. 
Judge Barry: No one has ever asked me to do it. 
Senator Biden: Well, the statute says you have the authority to do it. I doubt whether the 
victims know about it. 
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Utilizing § 3664(f)(4), a victim could absolve a defendant from paying an 
outstanding restitution order. The victim would petition the court to 
structure, or restructure, the restitution order to take the form of in-kind 
payments. The in-kind payment would be directed to the victim (or other 
entity) and consist of nominal services. The conversion of the monetary order 
into nominal services would absolve the defendant of obligations under the 
outstanding restitution order. 
Even though both conditions for settlement are met, the § 3664(f) 
mechanism is perhaps the most difficult tool with which to effectuate 
settlement. First, the scope of victim discretion is ambiguous. A sentencing 
judge may not order in-kind payments to the victim without victim consent, 
but in practice, it is not clear that a victim may initiate this process.71 Second, 
the mechanism may not effectively absolve the defendant of her liability. It is 
not clear that a sentencing court would permit the conversion of monetary 
restitution into nominal services. A court that required a demonstration that 
the value of services equated to the value of the monetary order would strip 
the mechanism of its effectiveness as a tool for settlement. 
This demonstrates the more fundamental issue with using § 3664(f) as a 
settlement tool. The provision requires the acquiescence of the sentencing 
judge to settlement because it is left to the judge to structure the restitution 
order under this provision. The judge then retains a veto on the agreement. 
While judicial oversight may carry other benefits,72 it limits the ability of 
victims to effectuate a settlement agreement. 
b. Section 3664(g) 
The enforcement scheme’s most robust grant of victim discretion is in 
§ 3664(g). The first subchapter of that provision provides that “[n]o victim 
shall be required to participate in any phase of a restitution order.”73 The grant 
of discretion afforded by § 3664(g)(1) is broad, and courts generally agree that 
a victim can utilize this provision to forgo accepting restitution payments 
altogether.74 In effect, the provision allows victims to waive restitution. 
However, whether waiving restitution absolves the defendant from having 
to pay the outstanding order is disputed. That is because § 3664(g)(2) 
 
Hearing on S. 173 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 17 (1995) (statements of Sen. Biden 
and J. Maryanne Barry) (emphasis added). 
71 But see supra discussion accompanying note 70. 
72 See infra Part III. 
73 § 3664(g)(1). 
74 See e.g., United States v. Speakman, 594 F.3d 1165, 1175 (10th Cir. 2010) (“[C]ourts are not 
required to order restitution if the victim declines the restitution . . . .”); see also United States v. 
Johnson, 378 F.3d 230, 244-45 (2d Cir. 2004) (interpreting § 3664(g) to read that “a victim need not 
accept restitution and . . . may assign his interest in restitution to the Crime Victims Fund”). 
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provides that “[a] victim may at any time assign the victim’s interest in 
restitution payments to the Crime Victims Fund . . . without in any way 
impairing the obligation of the defendant to make such payments.”75 This 
provision has precipitated a circuit split as to whether such waiver permits a 
court to transfer sua sponte the outstanding restitution obligation to the Crime 
Victims Fund (CVF).76 If a court may, or even must, assign the restitution to 
the CVF, then the provision is not a useful tool for settlement because it 
would not allow a victim to absolve the defendant’s outstanding restitution 
obligation. As that is a necessary condition to effectuate settlement, a victim’s 
ability to settle an outstanding order using this mechanism turns on how a 
court resolves this question. 
i. No Sua Sponte Transfer 
A minority of courts have held that sua sponte transfer is inconsistent with 
the MVRA. In United States v. Speakman, the Tenth Circuit held that when a 
victim waives a restitution order, the waiver absolves the defendant from 
paying restitution because a court cannot on its own assign the payment to 
the CVF.77 The Tenth Circuit reasoned that restitution is only mandatory 
when ordered to the victim or the victim’s estate. The court interpreted 
§ 3664(g)(2) to permit restitution be made to the CVF only if 
the “victim ‘assign[s] the victim’s interest in restitution payments to the 
Crime Victims Fund.’”78 Further, the Speakman court noted that the Senate 
considered and rejected a broader version of § 3664(g)(1), which, quoting a 
Senate Report, would have provided: 
No victim shall be required to participate in any phase of a restitution order. 
If a victim declines to receive restitution made mandatory by this title, the 
court shall order that the victim’s share of any restitution owed be deposited in the 
Crime Victims Fund in the Treasury.79 
This version of the statue would have required a sentencing court to assign 
outstanding restitution to the CVF even when a victim waived her right to 
restitution. The Tenth Circuit reasoned that the Senate’s rejection of this 
language supported the conclusion that only a victim may assign an 
outstanding restitution order to the CVF. 
 
75 § 3664(g)(2). 
76 See infra subsections II.B.2.b.i–ii. 
77 594 F.3d at 1175. 
78 Id. (quoting § 3664(g)(2)) (alteration in original). 
79 Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 104-179, at 6 (1995) (alteration in opinion)). 
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Under a Speakman interpretation, a victim could exercise discretion to 
absolve the defendant from paying an outstanding restitution order.80 A victim 
could either agree to waive the entirety of the restitution for some guaranteed 
consideration or agree to waive restitution once an agreed upon amount of 
restitution had been paid, which would have the effect of settling restitution. 
Either way, such a reading makes § 3664(g)(1) a viable tool for settlement. 
ii. Sua Sponte Transfer 
A majority of circuits reject the Speakman approach. The leading case to 
this effect is the Second Circuit’s opinion in United States v. Johnson.81 The 
Johnson court started from the position that the language of § 3663A obligates 
a sentencing court to order restitution, “[n]otwithstanding any other 
provision of law.”82 Therefore, the Johnson court reasoned, neither 
§ 3664(g)(1) nor (g)(2) can reasonably be interpreted as carving out an 
exception to the mandatory nature of § 3663A.83 Without some evidence in 
the text or history of the legislation to supersede the plain language of 
§ 3663A that restitution is mandatory, the court held that the defendants’ 
arguments against sua sponte transfer must be rejected. The Johnson court 
further concluded that although § 3664(g)(2) authorizes victims to make such 
an assignment, it does not preclude the court from doing so. 
Other circuits have followed in Johnson’s footsteps.84 Moreover, there is 
reason to believe that those circuits that classify restitution as primarily 
criminal will also follow the decision in Johnson.85 
Although the Johnson interpretation does not prevent victims from waiving 
restitution, it does curtail the effectiveness of § 3664(g)(1) mechanisms as a 
settlement tool. Under Johnson, when a victim waives restitution, then a 
sentencing court must assign the outstanding obligation to the CVF. Therefore, 
the Johnson approach prevents a victim from absolving the defendant’s 
outstanding obligation, which makes settlement impossible. Absent the 
 
80 In addition to the Tenth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit also endorses this reading of §§ 3664 
(g)(1)–(2). United States v. Pawilinski, 374 F.3d 536, 539-50 (7th Cir. 2004). 
81 378 F.3d 230, 244-45 (2d Cir. 2004). 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 The First and Ninth Circuits have also held that waiving restitution does not absolve the 
defendant’s obligation. See United States v. Ziskind, 471 F.3d 266, 270 (1st Cir. 2006); United States 
v. Hankins, 858 F.3d 1273, 1277 (9th Cir. 2017). 
85 See, e.g., United States v. Brandner, No. 3:13-CR-00103-SLG, 2016 WL 4644463, at *4 (D. 
Alaska Sept. 6, 2016) (“The Court finds the Second Circuit’s approach to be more consonant both with 
the statutory text and structure and with the Ninth Circuit’s general approach to restitution, and 
adopts and applies that approach here.”). 
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Supreme Court resolving this split or Congress amending the statute, the use 
of § 3664(g)(1) as a tool for settlement will depend on where a victim lives.86 
c. Section 3664 (m)(1)(B) 
Section 3664(m) is the mechanism that is most conducive to victim 
settlement because it grants broad discretion to victims and that discretion 
may be exercised to absolve a defendant of an outstanding restitution order. 
Section 3664(m) governs the collection of restitution orders. It provides 
two means by which a restitution order may be enforced. First, the 
government may enforce restitution orders in the same way it would collect 
fines under 18 U.S.C § 227(c).87 Second, a victim may enforce a restitution 
order by means of an abstract judgment in the form of “a lien on the property 
of the defendant located in such State in the same manner and to the same 
extent and under the same conditions as a judgment of a court of general 
jurisdiction in that State.”88 
The victim-enforcement mechanisms of § 3664(m)(1)(B) can be used to 
settle an outstanding restitution order. While the statute places some 
limitations on a victim’s ability to enforce a restitution order across state lines, 
it does not eliminate victim discretion altogether. Once a victim “register[s], 
record[s], docket[s], or index[es] such abstract in accordance with the rules and 
requirements relating to judgments of the court of the State where the district 
 
86 The Johnson court’s reasoning is nonetheless flawed. The Johnson court correctly states that 
§ 3663A expressly prohibits interpretation of “any other provision of law” to create an exception to 
the obligations imposed on sentencing courts. But that obligation is only to “order” restitution be made 
to the victim. It is not an obligation that the restitution order be administered and enforced exactly the 
way in which the order was issued. Several of the statute’s enforcement provisions make clear that once 
a court has ordered restitution be made to the victim, then the victims and the court may structure or 
change the order. Most obviously, § 3664(g)(2) allows a victim to direct restitution to the CVF.  
The Johnson court’s interpretation conflates lack of judicial discretion in ordering restitution 
with a lack of subsequent court and victim discretion in administering that restitution order. In 
doing so, the Johnson court renders most of § 3664 moot. That is contrary to the clear legislative 
intent in creating a means by which to administer restitution in a uniform manner. A more 
appropriate interpretation would make the assignment of restitution to the CVF a function of a 
victim’s choice—that is, a court may (or may not) assign restitution depending on what the victim 
wishes. Unfortunately, neither the Speakman nor the Johnson court adopts such a victim-centric 
approach. 
87 18 U.S.C. § 3664(m) (2012). 
88 § 3664(m)(1)(B). It is worth highlighting the final language of the statute. In the version 
approved by both the House and Senate Judiciary Committees, the relevant section reads that a victim 
may enforce the order “in the same manner as a judgment in a civil action.” S. REP. NO. 104-179, at 7 
(1995); H.R. REP. NO. 104-16, at 8 (1996). However, by the time of its passage, the law was amended 
to read as it does now. The Senate Judiciary Committee approved the pre-amendment bill on April 17, 
1996 and the House Judiciary Committee approved it on April 18, 1996. The final post-amendment bill 
was passed by both houses on April 24, 1996. It is not clear from the legislative history why the 
amendment was made. 
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court is located,” she has discretion to act upon that lien “in the same manner 
and to the same extent and under the same conditions as a judgment of a court 
of general jurisdiction in that State.”89 This provision provides victims a broad 
grant of discretion regarding when and how to enforce a restitution order. 
A victim may exercise that discretion to absolve a defendant’s obligation 
by assigning the lien to the defendant. Doing so would absolve the 
defendant’s obligation because, in general, a party may not have a lien on his 
or her own property. “A lien is extinguished if it and the ownership of the 
property become vested in one person.”90 The extinguishment of the lien 
would absolve the defendant’s outstanding restitution order. 
Section 3664(m) thus provides a useful settlement tool. After a victim 
“register[ed], record[ed], docket[ed], or index[ed] such abstract in accordance 
with the rules and requirements relating to judgments of the court of the 
State where the district court is located,” the victim could then assign that 
lien to the defendant in exchange for consideration. The lien would merge 
with the defendant’s estate and absolve her of outstanding liability.91 The 
victim and defendant would memorialize that bargain in a contract to 
effectuate that agreement.92 
*  *  * 
To settle an outstanding restitution order, a victim must (i) have 
discretion to effectuate a settlement and (ii) that discretion must be able to 
absolve a defendant of her restitution order. Section 3664 provides victims 
with an opportunity to participate in the administration and enforcement of 
restitution orders. Through the mechanisms described, that opportunity to 
participate can be exercised to absolve defendants of an outstanding 
restitution order. Under the existing restitution scheme, victims may exercise 
discretion to settle outstanding restitution orders. In other words, the MVRA 
provides victims with the opportunity and “the authority to settle, release, 
satisfy, or otherwise modify a restitution judgment.”93 
 
89 § 3664(m)(1)(B). 
90 51 AM. JUR. 2D Liens § 64 (2018). 
91 See id. (“The ‘merger doctrine’ provides that when a greater and lesser estate coincide and 
meet in one and the same person without any intermediate estate, the lesser is merged into the 
greater; when the holder of a lien acquires the estate of the lienor, the lien interest is merged in the 
fee and the lien is extinguished.”). 
92 Because the lien assignment and contract would turn on state law, the ability of victims to 
take advantage of this mechanism would vary according to the contours of individual state contract 
and property law. However, that is true regardless of what the mechanism is being used for—that 
is, whether being used to settle a restitution payment as described here or being used to collect the 
lien in the full amount. 
93 United States v. Hankins, 858 F.3d 1273, 1277 (9th Cir. 2017). 
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III. VICTIM CONTROL 
Recognizing that the MVRA permits victims to settle outstanding 
restitution orders raises two questions. First, why does the MVRA permit 
such discretion? And second, why would victims exercise that discretion? This 
Part explores the history of the victims’ rights movement, the enacting intent 
of the MVRA, and the experience of victims with the federal restitution 
scheme to provide answers. 
A. Ensuring Victim Participation 
Providing a victim the opportunity to participate in the administration 
and enforcement of restitution orders is consistent with the goals of the 
victim rights’ movements and the enacting intent of the MVRA. 
Although the modern victims’ rights movement consists of a 
heterogeneous group of scholars, advocates, and entities, a central tenet of the 
movement is that victim participation in the criminal justice system should 
be enhanced.94 As one leading scholar on the victims’ rights movement 
observed: “The movement, in short, seeks to create a third model of criminal 
procedure—one focusing not on prosecuting cases in the system or protecting 
the civil rights of criminal defendants but rather guarantee victims the right 
to participate in the process.”95 
The MVRA’s enforcement mechanisms effectuate that goal. As previously 
noted, the provisions of § 3664 provide victims with the right, but not the 
obligation, to participate in the administration and enforcement of restitution 
orders. Settlement carries the goal of enhanced victim participation into the 
administration and enforcement of restitution orders. 
Section 3664’s alignment with the victims’ rights movement is no 
coincidence. Congress drafted the MVRA to vindicate victims’ rights. In 
explaining the need for the statute, the House Report stated: 
There has been significant progress over the last 15 years in addressing the needs of 
crime victims. Their voices are no longer missing from the national debate concerning 
criminal justice. In spite of this progress, however, additional reforms are needed. 
Under existing law, crime victims’ rights are still too often overlooked.96 
The Senate Report echoed that purpose in declaring that it was “essential that 
the criminal justice system recognize the impact that crime has on the victim.”97 
Moreover, lawmakers understood that MVRA promoted the participatory 
goal of the victims’ rights movement. Then-Senator Joe Biden made this 
 
94 See generally DOUGLAS E. BELOOF, VICTIMS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 19-40 (2d ed. 1999). 
95 Id. at 5. 
96 H.R. REP. NO. 104-16, at 4 (1995). 
97 S. REP. NO. 104-179, at 18 (1995). 
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point explicitly when he described victims as “forgotten” by the system and 
emphasized that “compassion and humanity dictate that we now try to restore 
to the victim the rights, the respect, and the protection they deserve.”98 The 
provisions of § 3664 that provide victims a right to participate in the 
restitution process reflect this enacting intent. 
In sum, the ability of victims to settle restitution orders is consistent with 
the goal of bolstering victim participation in the criminal justice system that 
animates both the victims’ rights movement and the MVRA. 
B. Forgoing Restitution Payments 
Recall that the MVRA requires a sentencing judge to order restitution to 
the victim in the full amount of the victim’s loss. If a victim does not settle 
an outstanding restitution order, then she is entitled to that sum of money. 
By definition, settlement entails forgoing at least some of that entitlement. 
Nonetheless, there are several circumstances that might motivate a victim to 
choose settlement. 
1. Harmful Restitution 
The MVRA defines a victim as anyone “directly and proximately harmed 
as a result of the commission of an offense for which restitution may be 
ordered.”99 The MVRA requires judges to order restitution in the full amount 
to all victims, with no exceptions. But there are circumstances where a victim 
may not actually benefit, and, in fact, may be harmed by the restitution order. 
The most obvious example is situations in which a victim and defendant 
jointly hold property. 
A roughly illustrative case is United States v. Speakman.100 In Speakman, the 
district court ordered the defendant, Mr. Speakman, to pay nearly $200,000 
to Mrs. Speakman, his wife, after he fraudulently transferred assets from an 
account held by Mrs. Speakman’s to a jointly held account.101 Mrs. Speakman 
specifically disclaimed her interest in receiving the money, stating that she 
“would not want to receive any restitution obtained at the expense of any other 
victim,” and that restitution “could set up a situation where [Mr. Speakman] 
might pursue [her] with empty promises.”102 
 
98 Hearing on S. 173 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 4 (1995). 
99 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(2) (2012). 
100 594 F.3d 1165 (10th Cir. 2012). 
101 Id. at 1167-68. Mr. Speakman had power of attorney over the account held by Mrs. 
Speakman to sell and buy securities, but he did not have authority to transfer assets out of the 
account, which is precisely what he did. Id. at 1167. 
102 Id. at 1169. 
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In any case, restitution would not have done much good for Mrs. 
Speakman. Even if Mr. Speakman had the requisite assets to meet the 
restitution obligation, forcing him to transfer those assets to his wife would 
be redundant, as any such assets were mutually held.103 Moreover, Mr. 
Speakman probably did not have the requisite assets. If this were the case, 
then Mrs. Speakman would have even greater incentives to settle the 
outstanding order. That is because onerous penalties accompany an 
outstanding restitution order.104 Mrs. Speakman may have tried to settle the 
restitution order to avoid those secondary effects that could do her and her 
family real harm.105 
As the Speakman case illustrates, some victims may be much better off by 
settling restitution and relieving defendants of their obligation to pay.106 
2. Illusory Restitution 
Victims who do not hold mutual property assets with defendants would 
probably prefer to receive the restitution order in full. But even these victims 
may choose to settle because of the disparity between the amount victims are 
owed in restitution and the amount victims can be expected to be paid. 
At the end of fiscal year 2015, there was $77 billion in uncollected federal 
victim restitution.107 There are several reasons for this. First, nearly eighty-five 
percent of criminal defendants are indigent at the time of their arrest.108 Such 
defendants may not have the assets to pay restitution following conviction. 
In addition, restitution follows a conviction, which could include 
imprisonment. Defendants in jail have limited means to earn money to pay 
restitution. Even after release from custody, a criminal conviction is a costly 
barrier for future employment opportunities, which may diminish a defendant’s 
 
103 Id. at 1168-70. 
104 See infra Section IV.B. 
105 Victims in such circumstances cannot avoid these consequences merely by refusing to 
enforce the order because the MVRA requires the government to enforce the order in the absence 
of victim enforcement. See § 3664(m)(1)(B) (“[A]t the request of a victim named in a restitution 
order, the clerk of the court shall issue an abstract of judgement . . . . ”). 
Speakman is only roughly illustrative because the appellate record suggests that there were other, 
secondary motivations for Mrs. Speakman’s decision—the possibility that unfulfilled payments 
would subject her to further emotional abuse. See infra subsection III.B.2 (discussing the emotional 
harm that may accompany unpaid restitution). 
106 Other examples could include other family members or business partners with mutual assets. 
107 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT: FISCAL 
YEAR 2015 tbl.8C (2015). Note that this does not include the amount of uncollected state restitution. 
108 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFF., GAO-01-664, CRIMINAL DEBT: OVERSIGHT AND 
ACTIONS NEEDED TO ADDRESS DEFICIENCIES IN COLLECTION PROCESSES 105, 110 (2001). 
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ability to pay restitution.109 Taken together, these factors reduce defendants’ 
ability to make restitution payments. 
Other factors may also affect recovery. First, restitution runs to anyone 
proximately harmed by a crime, which can lead to attenuated causation chains 
that dramatically inflate the total amount of restitution owed.110 Professor 
Courtney Lollar has documented several examples where such attenuated 
chains of causation leave the defendant paying for victims’ losses that are only 
tangentially related to the crime.111 Second, anecdotal evidence suggests that, 
when faced with restitution orders that seem insurmountable, defendants are 
less willing to make the effort required to compensate victims.112 Defense 
attorney James Felman made this point to Congress during hearings on the 
MVRA: “Among the costs of ordering a defendant to pay what everyone 
recognizes he or she cannot is that there is little incentive for the defendant 
to try.”113 In fact, despite making restitution orders mandatory, the MVRA 
has not resulted in victims receiving appreciably more restitution.114 
Faced with such a low probability of recovering restitution in full, victims 
may opt to settle for several reasons. First, victims may be motivated by 
dissatisfaction with the restitution process. Studies indicate that victim 
dissatisfaction correlates with the percentage of restitution orders that go 
unpaid.115 Neither the “actual dollars awarded nor payment time” have “an 
impact on victim satisfaction with the restitution process.”116 It could be that 
unpaid restitution orders create a “false hope” among victims.117 Dissatisfied 
victims may settle to achieve finality and closure with the restitution process. 
 
109 See Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 AM. J. SOC. 937, 960 (2003) (“The 
finding that ex-offenders are only one half to one third as likely as nonoffenders to be considered by 
employers suggests that a criminal record indeed presents a major barrier to employment”). 
110 See e.g., United States v. Chalupnik, 514 F.3d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 2008) (vacating the district 
court’s restitution order, which required the defendant pay even though the victim suffered no 
financial loss). 
111 See Courtney E. Lollar, What Is Criminal Restitution?, 100 IOWA L. REV. 93, 94-95 (2014). 
112 See Dickman, supra note 46, at 1697. 
113 Id. at 1696 (quoting Felman’s testimony). 
114 Mandatory restitution has led to a fall in recovery rate and only a “marginal” increase in 
total restitution paid to victims. See Letter from Clarence A. Lee, Assoc. Dir., Admin. Office of the 
U.S. Courts, to Gary T. Engel, Dir. of Fin. Mgmt. & Assurance, U.S. Gen. Accounting Office (June 
6, 2001), in U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFF., supra note 108, at 105 (“[T]he Mandatory Victims 
Restitution Act has resulted in a large surge in criminal debt, but it has not resulted in any 
appreciable increase in compensation to the victims of crime, in most cases, because of the 
defendants’ inability to pay.”). 
115 See e.g., Robert C. Davies et. al, Restitution: The Victim’s Viewpoint, 15 JUST. SYS. J. 746, 753 
(1992) (finding the percentage of the award actually paid by the offender accounts for a significant 
percentage of victim satisfaction). 
116 Id. 
117 See PEGGY TOBOLOWSKY, CRIME VICTIM RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 174-75 (2d ed. 2010) 
(summarizing several studies showing that unpaid restitution impedes victims’ psychological 
recovery from crime and reduces their satisfaction with the criminal justice system). 
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Victims may see this as preferable to holding out hope that a defendant will 
be able to pay the amount in full one day. 
Second, a victim may settle to maximize her net recovery. Most 
restitution orders are less than $5,000.118 The cost associated with delayed 
payment or enforcing that order may be more than the amount recovered, 
thus settlement may be preferable to incurring the cost of collection. A victim 
may take a fraction of the total owed for an up-front payment. 
Finally, a victim may be willing to settle a restitution order to maximize 
her share of a defendant’s limited resources. For example, when there are 
multiple victims to which the defendant owes restitution but only limited 
ability to meet those obligations, a victim may be willing to settle to secure 
her share. Although it is unclear how often such a situation arises, it could 
create a potential race to the courthouse to effectuate settlement.119 
This is not an exhaustive list of the reasons a victim may choose to settle 
an outstanding restitution order. The choice to settle will turn on specific 
factual circumstances. The individual or institutional nature of the victim, the 
total number of victims, the size of the restitution order, and the defendant’s 
financial position may all contribute to a victim’s willingness to settle an 
outstanding restitution order. Nonetheless, the above discussion 
demonstrates that at least some segment of the victim population may choose 
to forgo recovering restitution and settle an outstanding order. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF VICTIM CONTROL 
Recognizing that victims may settle restitution orders brings into focus 
concerning implications of victim control. First, victims may be harassed or 
even coerced into settling outstanding restitution orders by a defendant. 
Second, victims may trigger a race to the courthouse in which some victims 
try to collect restitution at the expense of others. Third, victims may engage 
in collusive bargaining with defendants. This Part explores each of these 
concerns in greater depth. 
A. Harassment and Coercion 
Victim harassment or coercion is a salient concern because a defendant’s 
interests are served by a victim’s decision to settle an outstanding restitution 
order. Most obviously, a victim that chooses to settle restitution reduces a 
defendant’s outstanding liability. Moreover, the penalties that accompany an 
outstanding restitution order can be onerous. If a defendant fails to pay a 
 
118 Dickman, supra note 46, at 1708. 
119 See infra Section IV.B. 
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restitution order, a court may revoke probation or supervised release, force 
the defendant to sell property to satisfy the order, or even imprison the 
defendant.120 Designed to pressure defendants to satisfy restitution orders, 
the consequences of unpaid restitution may push defendants to pressure 
victims to settle. That pressure could turn into harassment or coercion. 
That said, the potential that pressure will lead to coerced settlements is 
mitigated by other provisions that protect victims. Statutes such as the Crime 
Victims’ Rights Act provides victims protection from unwanted contact with 
defendants, which could prevent harassing solicitations to negotiate.121 States 
also provide similar protection for victims.122 
For those victims willing to engage with defendants, several factors would 
protect against coerced settlements. First, a victim pressured to accept an unwanted 
settlement can simply walk away secure in the knowledge that no entitlement is 
given up.123 The default of no settlement is that the restitution order stands.124 
Second, § 3664’s enforcement mechanisms provide a check on coerced 
settlement. For example, a victim using § 3664(f) or § 3664(g) to settle a 
restitution order must return to the sentencing court to effectuate the 
settlement.125 The need to return to court may deter defendants from 
harassing victims. In addition, the sentencing court may proactively screen 
out coerced settlements.126 
Contract law provides another check on coerced settlements because it 
requires mutual consent, valid consideration, and holds as invalid contracts 
that are a byproduct of duress, undue influence, or misrepresentation.127 A 
 
120 Section 3613A specifically provides that a court may: 
revoke probation or a term of supervised release, modify the terms or conditions of 
probation or a term of supervised release, resentence a defendant pursuant to section 
3614, hold the defendant in contempt of court, enter a restraining order or injunction, 
order the sale of property of the defendant, accept a performance bond, enter or adjust 
a payment schedule, or take any other action necessary to obtain compliance with the 
order of a fine or restitution. 
18 U.S.C. § 3613A (2012). 
121 See 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (2012) (“A crime victim has . . . the right to be reasonably protected 
from the accused.”). 
122 See, e.g., OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 34 (“The victim . . . of a crime has the right to know the 
location of the defendant following an arrest”); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 11.101 (2016) (establishing the 
Crime Victims Act in recognition of the importance of victim protection and cooperation). 
123 Such a victim need not even take steps to enforce the order because the MVRA allows the 
government to do that on her behalf. See § 3664(m)(1)(A)(i). 
124 Relatedly, this puts a victim willing to negotiate with a defendant in a strong bargaining 
position because the restitution order will necessarily be greater than any proposed settlement.  
125 See supra Part II. 
126 Note that victims using § 3664(m)(1)(B) to settle do not need to return to the sentencing 
court. Nonetheless, they must enter a valid contract to effectuate the release of the judgment lien. 
127 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 17, 71, 164, 175, 177 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
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defendant coerced into an unwanted settlement would have the ability to seek 
redress in state court to invalidate the settlement agreement. Although not 
fool-proof, such provisions would militate against coerced settlements. 
B. Race to the Courthouse 
Another concern is raised when multiple victims seek to maximize their 
recovery from a defendant’s limited assets. This may trigger a race to the 
courthouse to settle with a defendant. For a stylized example, suppose a 
defendant owes two victims $5,000 each, but the defendant has only $4,000 in 
assets. Each victim may try and settle to maximize her individual recovery. 
Recall that under § 3664(m)(1)(B), victims could effectuate settlement outside 
the view of the sentencing court. 
The case of United States v. Perry demonstrates that this scenario is not 
entirely speculative.128 In Perry, a defendant convicted of securities fraud was 
ordered to pay restitution totaling $715,078.40 to a host of victims.129 The 
district court ordered Perry to make payments to the clerk so that money 
could be forwarded to victims pro rata.130 However, one victim, a ninety-one-
year-old woman, took advantage of § 3664(m)(1)(B) to obtain a state 
judgment lien on Perry’s property from an Ohio state court.131 When Perry 
tried to liquidate his assets and turn over the money to the clerk, the lien 
prevented the execution of the sale. In response, the district court vacated the 
state lien and allowed the sale.132 
On appeal to the Sixth Circuit, the appellees, other victims to whom 
restitution was owed by the defendant, argued that the district court’s order 
was appropriate because absent such action, a race to the courthouse would 
ensue.133 The Sixth Circuit dismissed the appellees concern: 
[T]he ‘race to the courthouse’ is a far-fetched concern. District courts have 
discretion to issue all sorts of orders that would interfere with the race to the 
courthouse: pure pro rata distribution, distribution to the neediest victims 
first, distribution to the most seriously injured first, pro rata within classes of 
victims, and so forth.134 
According to the Sixth Circuit, a district court has the flexibility in the 
initial order to protect victims against being deprived of their fair share. 
 
128 360 F.3d 519, 539 (6th Cir. 2004). 
129 Id. at 521. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. at 522. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. at 538. 
134 Id. 
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Although a federal district court is limited in its ability to vacate a lien that 
conflicts with a pro rata order, victims may challenge the lien in state court.135 
The Sixth Circuit’s reasoning in Perry applies to settlement of restitution 
orders as well. A district court that anticipated such a problem and ex ante 
ordered restitution be distributed pro rata could limit the incentives to start a 
race. That said, the structure of § 3664(m)(1)(B) places the burden on victims 
to enforce compliance with the federal court’s order. As was the case in Perry, 
a state court may issue a lien that conflicts with the pro rata distribution, but 
other victims will have ample room to challenge such a lien in state court. 
The race to the courthouse is a real, but manageable, effect of settlement. 
C. Collusion 
Victim settlement also creates the possibility that victims and defendants 
collude in reaching a settlement.136 The concern is that victims may forgo 
their entitlement to restitution for questionable or even problematic reasons. 
The Dougherty case highlights this concern. Recall that Dougherty was 
convicted of defrauding both the U.S. government and the Local 98 by 
engaging in fraudulent accounting to avoid contributing to the Local 98’s 
retirement fund. Dougherty covered up the scheme by bribing union officials. 
Then, Dougherty and those same union officials attempted to settle the 
outstanding restitution order for a fraction of the total amount. The attempted 
settlement raises concerns about collusion. First, union officials who negotiate 
settlement on behalf of their members face serious principal–agency problems. 
Second, there is a concern that Dougherty and Local 98 may have an ongoing 
business relationship, which would raise concerns about arm’s-length 
bargaining. The record shows no proof of actual collusion, but the facts raise 
the specter of it. 
The problem is that collusive settlement negotiations would be 
particularly difficult for sentencing courts to police. There is limited room for 
a court to police such agreements ex ante without limiting victim discretion 
altogether. Further, § 3664(m)(1)(B) provides a mechanism to settle 
restitution outside the view of the sentencing court, so there is limited ability 
to police agreements reached through that mechanism ex post.137 
 
135 Id. at 538. Note that the Sixth Circuit did acknowledge that it could “conceive of cases in 
which the availability or function of state lien law creates problems.” Id. at 539 n. 13. 
136 Of course, any settlement requires the victim to forfeit entitlement to some sum of money 
for a benefit that may (or may not) comport with a strict welfare-maximizing rationale. Note that I 
do not attempt to define best interest in a welfare-maximizing manner. Instead, I evaluate only the 
effectuation of victim choice. 
137 As noted, victims settling using §§ 3664 (f)(3) or (g)(1) must go through the sentencing 
court, which allows for some review of potentially collusive settlement. See supra Part II. 
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Nonetheless, while victim discretion opens the door to the possibility of 
collusive conduct, it is not clear how often such discretion will be put to 
abusive effect. Query how often the interests of victims and defendants will 
align such that the possibility of collusion is even available. 
More fundamentally, the ability to enter into collusive agreement is a 
direct function of the discretion afforded to victims. The potential for 
collusive settlements may be the cost of the victim-centric focus of the 
criminal justice system that the MVRA expressly contemplates. That is, by 
valuing victims’ interests, a more victim-centric criminal justice system must 
incorporate those views in the administration of justice even at the expense 
of other goals, such as maximizing the punitive effect of a sentence. 
V. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
So far, this Comment has undertaken a largely descriptive analysis in 
determining whether the MVRA permits victims to settle outstanding 
restitution orders. It concludes with a more normative focus. First, this Part 
analyzes the informational and procedural barriers to victim settlement. It 
then discusses whether such barriers should be lowered. Determining that 
there is an argument in favor of lowering those barriers, this Part concludes 
with policy recommendations for Congress and the courts. 
A. Information and Procedural Barriers 
While the MVRA’s enforcement provisions contemplate the ability of a 
victim to settle an outstanding restitution order, victims face substantial 
informational and procedural barriers to settlement.138 That is, a victim 
interested in settling an outstanding restitution order may not be aware of 
the available procedural mechanisms or, alternatively, may not have the legal 
sophistication to take advantage of those mechanisms. Although it is difficult 
to determine the impact of such informational and procedural barriers, it is 
likely that those barriers are high. 
A victim willing to settle an outstanding restitution order must know that 
settlement is a possibility, but it is far from clear that most victims or their 
legal representatives are aware that settlement is possible. For that matter, it 
 
138 Specifically, by “informational barriers” I refer to characteristics of the MVRA enforcement 
scheme that limit victims’ knowledge about the ability to settle orders. By “procedural barriers,” I 
refer to characteristics of the MVRA enforcement scheme that increase the number or complexity 
of steps needed to effectuate settlement. 
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is not clear that sentencing judges are fully aware of how the MVRA’s 
provisions permit settlement.139 
Although it is difficult to prove lack of knowledge, several factors suggest 
informational barriers are high. First, the MVRA does not explicitly 
authorize settlement. There is no “this is how one settles an outstanding 
restitution order” clause, so a willing victim must take a close look at the 
MVRA to recognize the possibility. Second, there is not much case law or 
academic work on the subject. This Comment is the first to explicitly address 
restitution and settlement, and there are very few published opinions dealing 
with the question. Finally, even if some victims have taken advantage of the 
MVRA enforcement provisions in the manner outlined here, there may be 
very little record of it. The most effective settlement mechanism, 
§ 3664(m)(1)(B), entails private activity outside the view of a sentencing 
court. The provisions that require petitioning a sentencing court may not 
generate a published or written opinion. Therefore, even a close observer of 
court opinions will be provided little notice that settlement is an option. 
Taken together, this suggests victims and their legal representatives face 
informational barriers to settlement. 
As for procedural barriers, a knowing and willing victim must still jump 
through several hoops to effectuate a settlement.140 It takes more than a victim 
assenting to a settlement agreement.141 Rather, a victim must take affirmative 
steps to give the settlement legal force. Even then, it is not clear that a district 
or state court will recognize the settlement. Based on this Comment’s 
research, the mechanisms outlined above are largely untested. Where a victim 
has tried to take advantage of the MVRA enforcement scheme to effectively 
settle an outstanding restitution order, namely through the waiver provision 
of Section 3664(g)(1), several courts have rejected the invocation of such 
mechanisms.142 Procedural barriers seem to limit settlement for all but the 
most enterprising victims. 
In sum, informational and procedural barriers likely prevent those victims 
interested in settling from doing so. 
 
139 Judge Maryanne Barry seemed to recognize that the MVRA permitted settlement of some 
sort during a hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee. See supra note 70. 
140 See supra Part II. 
141 Therefore, to revisit the initial Dougherty case, unless Local 98 takes steps to initiate 
settlement through the MVRA’s enforcement provisions, the district court should reject the petition 
to settle restitution. Under the MVRA’s enforcement scheme, it is the victim, not the defendant, 
that must take affirmative steps to effectuate settlement. 
142 See e.g., United States v. Johnson, 378 F.3d 230, 245 (2d Cir. 2014) (concluding that a 
defendant’s victim “may not veto,” in the event of a settlement, “the obligation of the District Court 
to impose” an order of restitution). 
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B. Lowering Barriers to Settlement 
Before turning to recommendations for lowering informational and 
procedural barriers, it is necessary to address the predicate normative 
question of whether such barriers ought to be lowered. 
The case for lowering informational barriers is clearer to make. The 
MVRA was enacted with the intent of incorporating victims and victims’ 
choices in the administration and enforcement of restitution orders. As this 
Comment has established, the mechanisms to effectuate settlement already 
exist. Lowering informational barriers would merely make victims more 
aware of how to use those mechanisms to effectuate their choices. While 
lowering informational barriers may also make defendants more aware of 
settlement and thus more likely to pressure victims, there are means to 
protect victims from defendants if need be.143 Because victims should be 
aware of the rights granted to them by Congress, informational barriers ought 
to be lowered. 
Lowering procedural barriers poses a more difficult question given the 
need to balance greater victim discretion with victim protection from 
unwanted settlement. On the one hand, complex procedural barriers to 
settlement limit victims’ discretion over their participation in the 
administration of restitution orders by cabining the choices available to 
victims. This sits uncomfortably with the MVRA’s goal of increasing victim 
participation in the restitution process. On the other hand, high procedural 
barriers protect against potentially coerced settlements by placing checks on 
victim settlement. Given this balancing, it is not implausible to argue that 
Congress got it right by enacting high barriers to settlement and thus erring 
on the side of protecting victims. 
But, there are reasons to be skeptical that Congress struck the proper 
balance. First, Congress enacted the MVRA based on an assumption that all 
victims’ interests would be vindicated by receiving full restitution.144 But 
there is not an insignificant number of victims who may prefer to settle.145 
This indicates that Congress may not have considered the rich diversity of 
victim experiences covered by the MVRA. Second, courts’ interpretation of 
the MVRA indicates that insufficient weight is given to victim participation. 
Instead, courts conflate the lack of judicial discretion with a lack of victim 
discretion. For example, the Johnson court’s interpretation of the MVRA 
renders much of Section 3664 moot, which forecloses victims’ ability to 
 
143 See supra Part IV. 
144 See Dickman, supra note 46, at 1691 (noting that Congress passed the MVRA believing it 
would enhance victim satisfaction by improving victim compensation). 
145 See supra Part III. 
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participate in the enforcement of restitution orders.146 Crucially, the limit on 
victim participation would apply whether that participation is related to 
settlement or not. This suggests that the lack of a simple procedural 
mechanism to settle an outstanding restitution order undermines victims’ 
ability to meaningfully participate in the enforcement of restitution orders. 
Taken together, this suggests that lower procedural barriers to settlement may 
be appropriate to effectuate the full scope of victims’ choices. 
C. Recommendations 
This Comment concludes with policy recommendations that would lower 
informational and procedural barriers to settlement and thus more fully 
vindicate victims’ interest. 
1. Congress 
Critics of the MVRA have called on Congress to take dramatic steps in 
restructuring the federal restitution scheme.147 While such legislative reform 
may be preferable, the focus of this Comment is both narrower and more 
practical. Instead of wholesale reform, Congress should amend § 3664 to 
make a victim’s right to settle outstanding restitution orders explicit and 
procedurally less complex. 
Although Congress could achieve this through several different means, 
the most straightforward would be to amend § 3664(m)(1)(B). Recall that this 
section details a victim’s ability to enforce restitution orders. Congress should 
add language to the effect that the ability to enforce a restitution order also 
entails the ability to settle a restitution order. For example, Congress could 
amend the section to read: “A victim may enforce or dispose the restitution 
order in the same manner as a judgment in a civil action.”148 This would signal 
to both judges and victims that settlement is permissible, which would lower 
informational barriers. In addition, it would make clear that § 3664(m)(1)(B) 
is a permissible mechanism to settle restitution, which would have the effect 
of lowering procedural barriers. 
 
146 See discussion accompanying supra note 86. 
147 See Dickman, supra note 46, at 1710 (“The failure of the MVRA to further victims’ interests 
or promote offender rehabilitation mandates a change in federal restitution policy.”). 
148 The proposed language builds on the original version of § 3664(m)(1)(B), which provided 
that “the victim may enforce the restitution order in the same manner as a judgment in a civil action.” 
S. REP. NO. 104-179, at 7 (1995). 
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2. Judiciary 
Obviously, sentencing judges do not have the same latitude as Congress 
to amend the MVRA. Nonetheless, sentencing judges should leverage their 
role in the restitution process to lower informational and, to the degree 
possible under current law, procedural barriers. 
Sentencing judges have the greatest ability to address current 
informational barriers to settlement. As noted, it is unclear whether victims 
are aware of the procedural mechanisms available to settle restitution awards. 
Sentencing judges could bridge that gap. Probation officers are already 
required to provide victims with information related to the restitution 
order.149 Specifically, the MVRA requires probation officers to provide notice 
of “the availability of a lien in favor of the victim pursuant to subsection 
(m)(1)(B).”150 Sentencing judges should instruct probation officers to inform 
victims of the full scope of § 3664(m)(1)(B), namely the ability to use such a 
mechanism to settle outstanding restitution orders. Such notice would lower 
informational barriers to settlement. 
Sentencing judges have much less latitude to lower procedural barriers to 
settlement. But even here, there are affirmative steps sentencing judges can 
take to empower victims to settle. Recall that, while § 3664(f) can be used to 
settle outstanding restitution orders, it requires the acquiescence of the 
sentencing judge because it is left to the judge to structure the restitution 
order.151 Recognizing the full scope of victim discretion in the MVRA, 
sentencing judges should be flexible in allowing victims to take advantage of 
the 3664(f)(3) provision to settle restitution orders. This would make 
settlement less procedurally onerous on victims without betraying the text or 
intent of the statute. 
CONCLUSION 
The MVRA generates millions of dollars of unpaid restitution every year. 
For a not insignificant portion of the victim community, settling an 
outstanding restitution order would vindicate their individual interests. The 
MVRA enforcement scheme creates mechanisms for victims to participate in 
the enforcement of outstanding restitution orders. Those provisions can be 
leveraged by victims to settle an outstanding restitution order. Although 
informational and procedural barriers to achieving settlement are high (and 
should be lowered), this Comment provides a blueprint for victims and their 
 
149 See § 3664(d)(2)(A). 
150 Id. 
151 See supra Part II. 
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representatives to take advantage of the provisions provided by the MVRA 
to achieve settlement. 
 
